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Abstract
Many explanations for home or local bias rely on information asymmetry: investors know
more about their home assets. A criticism of these theories is that asymmetry should disappear
when information is tradable. This criticism is flawed. If investors have asymmetric prior beliefs,
but choose how to allocate limited learning capacity before investing, they will not necessarily
learn foreign information. Investors want to exploit increasing returns to specialization: The
bigger the home information advantage, the more desirable are home assets; but the more home
assets investors expect to own, the higher the value of additional home information. Even
with a tiny home information advantage, and even when foreign information is no harder to
learn, many investors will specialize in home assets, remain uninformed about foreign assets,
and amplify their initial information asymmetry. The more investors can learn, the more home
biased their portfolios become. The model’s predictions are consistent with observed patterns
of foreign investment, returns, and portfolio flows.
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Observed returns on national equity portfolios suggest substantial benefits from international
diversification, yet individuals and institutions in most countries hold modest amounts of foreign
equity. Many studies document such home bias (see French and Poterba, 1991, Tesar and Werner,
1998 and Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004). One hypothesis is that capital is internationally
immobile across countries, yet this is belied by the speed and volume of international capital flows
among both developed and developing countries. An American investor, for example, could have a
highly diversified portfolio simply by purchasing foreign stocks or ADRs on US exchanges. Another
hypothesis is that investors have superior access to information about local firms or economic
conditions (Brennan and Cao 1997, Hatchondo 2004). But this seems to replace the assumption of
capital immobility with the equally implausible assumption of information immobility. For example,
if an American wished, she could presumably pay someone to divulge information about foreign
firms. Such trade in information could potentially undermine the home bias.
We nevertheless propose information as an explanation for home bias. The question to be ad-
dressed, then, is why information does not flow freely across borders. Using tools from information
theory (Sims 1998, 2003), we model an investor who faces a choice about what to learn, before form-
ing his portfolio. This investor will naturally build on his existing advantage in local information
because there are increasing returns to specializing in learning about one asset. A small information
advantage makes a local asset less risky to a local investor. Therefore, he expects to hold slightly
more local assets than a foreign investor would. But, information has increasing returns in the
value of the asset it pertains to: as the investor decides to hold more of the asset, it becomes more
valuable to learn about. So, the investor chooses to learn more and hold more of the asset, until
all his capacity to learn is exhausted on his home asset. The initial small information advantage
is magnified. The result is that information market segmentation persists not because investors
can’t learn what locals know, nor because it is too expensive, but because they don’t choose to;
capitalizing on what they already know is a more profitable strategy. Information immobility is
plausible because information is a good with increasing returns.
In section 2, we argue that an initial information advantage alone is not enough to generate
the home bias. To make this point, we examine a model where the increasing returns to learning
mechanism is shut down by forcing investors to take their portfolios as given, when they choose what
to learn. These investors minimize investment risk by learning about risk factors that they are most
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uncertain about. With sufficient capacity learning undoes all initial information advantage, and
therefore all home bias. To generate a large home bias, the cost of processing foreign information
would have to be larger than what is implied by the data.
Section 3 describes a general equilibrium, rational expectations model where investors choose
what home or foreign information to learn, and then choose what assets to hold. The interaction
of the information decision and the portfolio decision causes investors to learn information that
magnifies their initial advantage. Consider two possible learning and investment strategies. One
strategy would be to learn a small amount about every asset. Small changes in beliefs about every
asset’s payoff would cause small deviations from a diversified portfolio. Another strategy would be
to learn as much as possible about a small number of assets, and then take a large position in those
assets. A portfolio biased toward well-researched assets poses less risk, because a large fraction of
the portfolio has been made substantially less risky, through learning. Efficient learning dictates
that investors should specialize. They should learn about assets they already know well, amplify
their initial information differences, and increase their home bias.
It is not the information constraint that drives investors to specialize. The model in section 2
uses the same constraint, yet investors who take portfolios as given want to equalize uncertainty
across risks. Rather, it is the feedback of the learning choice and the portfolio choice on each other
that generates the increasing returns. The feedback arises from the unique properties of information
as a good: the more shares a piece of information can be applied to, the more benefit it provides.
This idea dates back to Wilson (1975), who found that information value is increasing in a firm’s
scale of operation. Because of this property, information has increasing returns in many settings
(Radner and Stiglitz 1984).
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that more scope for diversification decreases the incentive
to learn. In contrast, our paper shows that when investors can choose what to learn about, the
incentive to diversify declines. Optimal portfolios contain a diversified component plus assets that
the investor learns about. Equilibrium asset returns induce investors to take a long position in
the assets they learn about, on average. Asset returns reflect the risk that the average investor
bears. An investor who specializes in home assets becomes more informed than the average investor
and earns excess risk-adjusted home returns. To capture, the excess return, investors take positive
positions in their home assets. With higher capacity, the investor holds a larger learning component,
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diversification falls, and the home bias increases.
A numerical example (section 3.5) shows that learning can magnify the home bias considerably.
When all home investors get a small initial advantage in all home assets (10% lower variance),
the home bias is between 5 and 46%, depending on the magnitude of investors’ learning capacity.
When each home investor gets a local advantage, that is concentrated in one local asset, the home
bias rises as high as the 76% home bias in U.S. portfolio data.
A variety of evidence supports the model’s predictions. First, locally-biased portfolios earn
higher abnormal returns on local stocks than more diversified ones (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001;
Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner, 2004). Section 4.1 shows that in a model where investors have
slightly more prior information about their region, they hold more local assets and earn abnormal
returns on those assets. Second, foreigners invest primarily in large stocks that are highly correlated
with the market (Kang and Stultz, 1997) and often outperform locals in these assets (Seasholes,
2004). Section 4.2 shows that a foreigner with more learning capacity than locals may learn about
a local risk factor. The optimal risk to learn will be one that the largest assets load on. With more
information than the average investor, he will outperform the market for the assets which load on
the factor: large assets that covary highly with other large assets. Third, nearby markets with
highly correlated returns, generate abundant information flows (Portes and Rey, 2003), large gross
equity flows (Portes, Rey and Oh, 2001) and low turnover rates (Tesar and Werner, 1994). Section
4.3 argues that having a home advantage in risks that nearby countries share, operates like having
a neighboring country advantage as well. This advantage makes learning about the neighbor more
profitable, and makes trading with a neighbor more like trading with a compatriot.
Magnifying information advantages generates effects that resemble a familiarity bias (Huberman
2001, Hong, Kubik and Stein 2004) or a loyalty effect (Cohen 2004). Massa and Simonov (2004)
argue that familiarity effects are information driven. They find that familiarity affects less-informed
investors more, diminishes when the profession or location of the investor changes, and generates
higher returns.
The information choices we investigate are similar to those in models of rational inattention.
However, that work has focused on time-series phenomena: delayed response to shocks (Sims
2003), inertia (Moscarini 2004), time to digest (Peng and Xiong 2005), and consumption smoothing
(Luo 2005). Instead, we relax the representative agent assumption and focus on the cross-section
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of individuals’ learning choices. Using a framework similar to Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2005), we introduce a two-country structure. The initial information differences allow us to explore
what home investors learns and what assets they hold.
Information advantages have been used to explain exchange rate fluctuations (Evans and Lyons,
2004, Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004), the international consumption correlation puzzle (Coval
2000), international equity flows (Brennan and Cao 1997), a bias towards investing in local stocks
(Coval and Moskowitz 2001), and the own-company stock puzzle (Boyle, Uppal and Wang 2003).
All of these explanations are bolstered by our finding that information advantages are not only
sustainable when information is mobile, but that asymmetry is often amplified when investors can
choose what to learn.
1 A Model of Learning and Investing
We begin by setting up a general framework in which to think about learning and investment
choices. In section 2 we examine the choice of what to learn when an investor takes his portfolio
as given and only wants to reduce the risk of that portfolio. Section 3 describes how learning and
investment decisions are made jointly in a noisy rational expectations, general equilibrium model.
This is a static model which we break up into 3-periods. In period 1, a continuum of investors
choose the distribution from which to draw signals about the payoff of the assets. The choice of
signal distributions is constrained by the investor’s information capacity, a constraint on the total
informativeness of the signals he can observe. In period 2, each investor observes signals from the
chosen distribution and makes his investment. Prices are set such that the market clears. In period
3, he receives the asset payoffs and consumes.
Preferences In order to study information choices, we want to begin by modeling investors who
benefit from acquiring information. Therefore, we give investors a preferences for early resolution of
uncertainty. Investors, with absolute risk aversion parameter ρ, maximize their expected certainty
equivalent wealth:
U = E1 {− log (E2[exp(−ρW )])} . (1)
Utility can instead be defined over consumption by assuming that all wealth is consumed at the end
of period 3. The term − log (E2[exp(−ρW )]) is the level of consumption that makes the investor
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indifferent between consuming that amount for certain and investing in his optimal portfolio, in
period 2. This certainty equivalent consumption is conditional on the realization of the signals the
investor has chosen to see. Since these signals are not known in period 1, the investor maximizes
the expected period-2 certainty equivalent, conditioning on information in prior beliefs.
This formulation of utility has the desirable feature that it treats learned information and prior
information as equivalent. It does so without losing the exponential structure of preferences that
will keep the problem tractable.
Budget Constraint Let r > 1 be the risk-free return and q and p be Nx1 vectors of the number
of shares the investor chooses to hold and the asset prices. Investor’s terminal wealth is then his
initial wealth W0, plus the profit he earns on his portfolio investments:
W = rW0 + q′(f − pr) (2)
Initial information We model two countries, home and foreign. Each has an equal-sized con-
tinuum of investors, whose preferences are identical. Home and foreign investors are endowed with
prior beliefs about a vector of asset payoffs f . Each investor’s prior belief is an unbiased, indepen-
dent draw from a normal distribution, whose variance depends on where the investor resides. Home
prior beliefs are µ ∼ N(f,Σ). Foreign prior beliefs are distributed µ? ∼ N(f,Σ?). Home investors
have lower-variance prior beliefs for home assets and foreign investors have lower-variance beliefs
for foreign assets. We will call this difference in variances a group’s information advantage.
Information acquisition At time 1, investors choose how much to learn about each asset’s
payoff. This choice is equivalent to choosing the variance-covariance matrix Ση of a normally-
distributed N-dimensional signal η about asset payoffs.1 Each investor gets a signal drawn from his
chosen distribution that is independent of the signals drawn by other investors. The independence
assumption is not crucial, but makes aggregation easier.
When asset payoffs co-vary, learning about one asset’s payoff is informative about other payoffs.
To describe what a signal is about, it is useful to decompose asset payoff risk into orthogonal risk
1In principle, investors can choose the kind of distribution from which they want to draw signals as well. In this
setting, normally distributed signals are optimal. When an objective is quadratic, normal distributions maximize the
entropy over all distributions with a given variance (see Cover and Thomas, 1991, chapter 10). Our objective will
turn out to have a quadratic form.
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factors and the risk of each factor. Learning is then a choice of how much to reduce the variance
of each independent risk factor. This decomposition breaks the prior variance-covariance matrix Σ
up into a diagonal eigenvalue matrix Λ, and an eigenvector matrix Γ: Σ = ΓΛΓ′. The Λi’s are the
variances of each risk factor i. The ith column of Γ (denoted by Γi) gives the loadings of each asset
on the ith risk factor.
To make aggregation tractable, we assume that home and foreign prior variances Σ and Σ?
have the same eigenvectors, but different eigenvalues. In other words, home and foreign investors
use their capacity to reduce risk from the same set of risk factors, but each starts out knowing a
different amount about each risk factor.
Without loss of generality, we bypass the choice of signals and model the choice over the posterior
beliefs directly. Since sums, products and inverses of prior and signal variance matrices will all have
eigenvectors Γ, posterior beliefs will have the same set of risk factors. We denote posterior beliefs
with a hat. We can express posterior variance Σ̂ = ΓΛˆΓ′, where Γ is taken as given and the
diagonal eigenvalue matrix Λˆ is the choice variable. In other words, holding the composition of the
risk factors they face constant, investors choose how much to reduce the risk of each factor. The
decrease in risk factor i’s variance (Λi− Λˆi) captures how much an investor learned about that risk.
Learning about risk factor i’s payoff (f ′Γi) means that this investor is learning about the ith
principal component of asset payoffs. Nothing prevents the investor from learning about many of
these principal components. The only thing this rules out is seeing a signal that contains correlated
information about risks that are independent. Learning about risk factors (principal components
analysis) has long been used in financial research as well as among practitioners. It approximates
the kinds of risk categories that investors might consider: business cycle risk, industry-specific risk,
firm-specific risk, etc. This paper’s main result, that investors learn about risks that they have
an initial advantage in, relies on gains to specialization and strategic substitutability in learning;
neither force depends on this assumption. However, this risk factor structure makes describing and
aggregating information choices tractable.
There are 2 constraints governing how the investor can choose his signals about risk factors.
The first is the capacity constraint ; it governs the quantity of information the investors is allowed
to observe. The work on information acquisition with one risky asset quantified information as
the ratio of variances of prior and posterior beliefs (Verrecchia, 1982). We generalize the metric
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to a multi-signal setting by bounding the ratio of the generalized prior variance to the generalized
posterior variance, |Σ̂| ≥ e−2K |Σ|, where generalized variance refers to the determinant of the
variance-covariance matrix. Capacity K can then be interpreted as the percentage by which an
investor can decrease the risk he faces, where risk is measured as the generalized standard deviation
of asset payoffs. We assume thatK is the same for all investors (section 4.2 relaxes this assumption).
This capacity constraint is one possible description of a learning technology. We think it is a relevant
constraint because it is a commonly-used distance measure in econometrics (a log likelihood ratio)
and in statistics (a Kullback-Liebler distance); it is equivalent to a bound on entropy reduction,
which has a long history in information theory as a quantity measure for information (Shannon
1948); it can be re-interpreted as a technology for reducing measurement error; it is a measure
of information complexity (Cover and Thomas 1991), and it has been used to describe limited
information processing ability in economic settings by Sims (1998). Since determinants are the
product of eigenvalues, the capacity constraint is
∏
i
Λˆi ≥ e−2K
∏
i
Λi. (3)
This particular technology is a strategically neutral and tractable way to describe a rich choice
set of signals. It differs from the technology in Mondria (2005) because it requires investors to use
capacity to infer asset-payoff relevant information from prices. We endow investors with K large
enough to process price information. This assumption prevents there being strategic motives for
learning introduced solely by the technology. It requires the same amount of capacity to observe a
given signal, whether others observe that signal or not. This constraint also implies that with infinite
capacity, all risk is learnable. In Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005), we relax this assumption.
This introduces decreasing returns to learning about one risk and makes the specialization result
less extreme. But it does not change the conclusion that investors prefer to learn about what they
already have an advantage in. Similarly, endogenizing the choice of how much capacity to acquire
would not change the decision of how to allocate that capacity, as long as cost was any increasing
function of the reduction in generalized variance.
The second constraint is the no negative learning constraint : the investor cannot acquire signals
that transmit negative information. Without this constraint, the investor might choose to increase
uncertainty about some risks so that he could decrease uncertainty further in other variables without
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violating the capacity constraint. Since negative learning, or intentional forgetting, does not make
sense in this context, we rule this out by requiring the variance-covariance matrix of the signal
vector η, Ση, to be positive semi-definite. Since a matrix is positive semi-definite when all its
eigenvalues are positive, the constraint is:
Ληi ≥ 0 ∀ i. (4)
Updating beliefs When investors’ portfolios are fixed (section 2), what investors learn does not
affect the market price. But when asset demand responds to observed information (section 3), the
market price is an additional noisy signal of this aggregated information. Using their prior beliefs,
their chosen signals, and information contained in prices, investors form posterior beliefs about
asset payoffs, using Bayes’ law.
Since prices are equilibrium objects, the information they contain depends on the solution to
the model. For now, we conjecture that prices are linear functions of the true asset payoffs such
that (rp−A) ∼ N(f,Σp), for some constant A. This conjecture is verified in proposition 2.
An investor j’s posterior belief about the asset payoff f , conditional on a prior belief µj , signal
ηj ∼ N(f,Σjη), and prices, is formed using Bayesian updating:
µˆj ≡ E[f |µj , ηj , p] =
(
(Σj)−1 + (Σjη)
−1 +Σ−1p
)−1 (
(Σj)−1µj + (Σjη)
−1ηj +Σ−1p (rp−A)
)
(5)
with variance that is a harmonic mean of the signal variances:
Σˆj ≡ V [f |µj , ηj , p] =
(
(Σj)−1 + (Σjη)
−1 +Σ−1p
)−1
. (6)
These are the conditional mean and variance that investors use to form their portfolios in (10).
Market clearing Asset prices p are determined by market clearing. The per-capita supply of
the risky asset is x¯+x, a positive constant (x¯ > 0) plus a random (n× 1) vector with known mean
and variance, and zero covariance across assets: x ∼ N(0, σ2xI). The reason for having a risky asset
supply is to create some noise in the price level that prevents investors from being able to perfectly
infer the private information of others. Without this noise, no information would be private, and
no incentive to learn would exist. We interpret this extra source of randomness in prices as due to
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liquidity or life-cycle needs of traders. The market clearing condition is
∫ 1
0
(Σ̂j)−1(µˆj − pr)dj = x¯+ x. (7)
Definition of Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of asset demands, asset prices and informa-
tion choices, such that
1. Given prior information about asset payoffs f ∼ N(µ,Σ), each investor’s information choice Λˆ
maximizes (1), subject to the capacity constraint (3) and the no-negative-learning constraint
(4);
2. Given posterior beliefs about asset payoffs f ∼ N(µˆ, Σ̂), each investor’s portfolio choice q
maximizes (1), subject to the budget constraint (2);
3. Asset prices are set such that the asset market clears: (7) holds;
4. Beliefs are updated, using Bayes’ law: (5) and (6);
5. Rational expectations hold: period-1 beliefs about the portfolio q are consistent with the true
distribution of the optimal q.
We rewrite period-2 expected utility to eliminate the period-2 expectation operator. In period 2,
the only random variable is f ∼ N(µˆ, Σ̂). Using the formula for a mean of a log normal, substituting
in the budget constraint (2), and substituting ΓΛˆΓ for Σ̂, we can restate the optimal learning and
investment problem as choosing portfolios and posterior risk factor variances to maximize the
expectation of a standard mean-variance objective:
max
q,Λˆ
E
[
ρq′(µˆ− rp)− ρ
2
2
q′ΓΛˆΓ′q|µ,Σ
]
. (8)
subject to (3) and (4)
2 Why Might Information Advantages Disappear?
Taken at face value, theories that explain the home bias by relying on an initial information advan-
tage seem unappealing. The problem with assuming that informational advantages will automat-
ically lead to a home bias is illustrated in the context of a model where investors choose what to
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learn, in order to minimize the variance of a given portfolio. In this setting, an investor who starts
out with more information about one asset will undo that advantage by learning about every other
asset, until he runs out of capacity, or is equally uncertain about all assets. As Karen Lewis (1999)
puts it, “Greater uncertainty about foreign returns may induce the investor to pay more attention
to the data and allocate more of his wealth to foreign equities.”
2.1 A Model without Increasing Returns to Information
Rather than regarding the portfolio as an endogenous choice variable, suppose the investor takes q
as given when choosing what to learn. It is this assumption that shuts down the increasing returns
to scale.
Let q˜i = Γ′iq. This represents the amount of risk factor i that an investor holds in his portfolio.
Then the objective (8) collapses to choosing Λˆi’s to minimize
∑
i q˜
2
i Λˆi, subject to the product
constraint (3) and the no-forgetting constraint Λi − Λˆi ≥ 0 ∀i. The first-order condition of the
Lagrangian problem describes the optimal learning rule.
Proposition 1 Learning Undoes Information Advantages Optimal learning about principal
components Γ produces a posterior belief Σ̂ = ΓΛˆΓ with eigenvalues Λˆi = min(Λi, 1q˜2i
M), where M
is a constant, common to all assets.
Proof in appendix A. What is important about this result is that the investor has a target
posterior variance for each risk ( 1
q˜2i
M), that does not depend on prior variance. An initial informa-
tion advantage in one risk factor may cause the prior variance to be less than the target posterior
variance. In this case, the investor would like to forget some of the information he knows, in order
to bring his posterior variance up to his target. The no-negative learning constraint keeps him from
forgetting. Instead, the investor chooses not to learn any more about this risk and devotes all his
capacity to learning about other risks whose variances are still above their target levels. Learning
about the most uncertain risks undoes an investor’s information advantage.
If the investor has sufficient capacity, he can fully compensate for any initial information ad-
vantage he was given. If this is the case, then no matter what the investor has local knowledge of,
he will always end up with the same posterior beliefs after learning.
Corollary 1 If an investor has an informational advantage in one risk factor Λi < Λj ∀j, then
10
with sufficient information capacity K ≥ K∗, the investor will choose the same posterior variance
that he would choose if his advantage was in any other risk factor: Λk < Λj ∀j for some k 6= i.
Proof in appendix A.1.
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Figure 1: Allocation of information capacity for a low and high-capacity representative investor.
The lightly shaded area represents the amount of capacity allocated to the factor. The dark area represents the size of the
information advantage. The unfilled part of each bin represents the posterior variance of the risk factor Λˆi. With high capacity,
adding the dark block to either bin would result in the ’water level’ Λˆ being the same for both risk factors. This is the case
where initial information advantages are undone by learning.
The top two panels of figure 1 illustrate this corollary graphically. The brick and water picture
is a metaphor for how information capacity (the water) is diverted to other risks when an investors
have an initial information advantage (the brick). We illustrate a case where there is a home and
foreign risk factor and q˜home = q˜foreign; the two bins are equally deep because both risk factors
are equally valuable to learn about. Giving an investor a home (foreign) information advantage is
like placing a brick in the left (right) side of the box. When capacity is high, a brick placed on
either side will raise the water level on both sides equally. Learning choices compensate for initial
information advantage in such a way as to render the nature of the initial advantage irrelevant.
Having an initial advantage in home risk will result in the same the same posterior variances for
home and foreign assets as having an advantage in foreign risk. Since the asset holdings depend on
posterior variances, the allocation to home and foreign assets is the same. With sufficient capacity,
initial information advantages cannot contribute to a home bias.
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The bottom two panels of figure 1 illustrate capacity allocation when capacity is low. The
investor would like to have the water level (his target posterior precision) be the same in both bins.
The no-forgetting constraint prevents him from breaking up the brick to achieve an equal water
level in both bins; he cannot equalize uncertainty across risk factors. The constrained optimal
solution is for the investor to devote all his capacity to learning about the risk factor he is most
uncertain about.
2.2 Mechanisms to Preserve Information Advantages
Without increasing returns, there are two ways that initial information advantages can persist:
low capacity or unequal processing costs. When capacity is low relative to the initial advantage
(as in the bottom panels of figure 1), more precise posterior beliefs for home assets generates a
home bias. However, if this explanation were true, then individuals would never choose to learn
about local assets; they would devote what little information capacity they had entirely to learning
about foreign assets. This implication is inconsistent with the multi-billion-dollar industry that
analyzes U.S. stocks, produces reports on the U.S. economy, manages portfolios of U.S. assets, and
then sells their products to American investors. Furthermore, Pastor (2000) shows that even an
investor, with no capacity to acquire signals, who passively observes all return realizations, must
have implausibly precise prior beliefs to justify the observed home bias.
The second candidate explanation is that investors have a harder time processing information
about foreign assets. We investigate a simple setting with one home and one foreign asset, with
prior variances σ2h and σ
2
f , posterior variances σˆ
2
h and σˆ
2
f , and zero covariance.
2 We replace (3) with
a capacity constraint that requires ψ times more capacity to process foreign than home information:
1
2
[log(σh)− log(σˆh)] + ψ2 [log(σf )− log(σˆf )] ≤ K. (9)
Next, we look at the optimal learning choice and the resulting optimal portfolio. Taking first
order conditions with respect to σˆ2h and σˆ
2
f and rearranging yields: σˆ
2
f/σˆ
2
h ≤ ψq2h/q2f . Capacity
permitting, an investor will set the ratio of posterior variances to ψq2h/q
2
f . Thus, for an investor
2When home and foreign assets are correlated, it is difficult to disentangle whether a given piece of information
is home or foreign. The assumption of zero correlation between home and foreign assets has two effects on this ψ
estimate. First, it will make the gains to diversification large and overestimate the benefits of learning about foreign
assets. This will bias ψ upward. Second, if home signals are partially informative about correlated foreign assets,
home bias would be lower. As a result, the friction ψ would have to be higher to explain the large home bias.
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that initially expects to hold a balanced home-foreign portfolio (qh = qf ), ψ ≥ σˆ2f/σˆ2h. Having
chosen what to learn and observed the chosen signal, the optimal portfolio for the investor with
exponential utility is: q? = 1ρ Σ̂
−1(µˆ − pr). This portfolio will generally not be what the investor
expected to hold in period 1 (q 6= q?). If home and foreign assets have the same expected return
(µˆ− pr), then q?hq?
f
= (σˆ
2
h)
−1
(σˆ2f )
−1 =
σˆ2f
σˆ2h
. Since the average U.S. investor holds 7.3 times more home assets
than foreign assets, ψ must be at least 7.3 to explain home bias. Adding an initial home advantage
does not alter this required processing cost, unless the advantage alone can account for the home
bias. Of course, home bias could still arise (and required processing costs would fall) if an investor
anticipated holding a lot of the home assets: qh > qf . But then home bias would arise not from
processing costs, but from portfolio expectations. This is exactly the mechanism explored in section
3.
Is this cost ratio ψ realistic? The model’s predicted relative shadow price of foreign information
(ψ = 7.3) seems out of line with various measures of the market price of foreign information.
First, English versions of financial newspapers from Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the UK are
inexpensive and easy to access. Second, average salaries for translators are typically 25% less than
for financial analysts.3 If producing home information required one analyst, and foreign information
required one analyst and one translator, then the translator’s salary would have to be 6.3 times the
analyst’s. Third, translating a 5000-page report costs approximately $900.4 If ψ = 7.3, a 5000-page
domestic research report must cost no more than $150. It is possible that agency problems and
legal/accounting differences add information costs, but the size of the costs must be large.5
The model discussed in this section shut off the increasing returns to information mechanism,
by holding investors’ portfolios fixed when they choose what to learn. Sustaining information
asymmetry is an uphill battle.
3Average salary figures from PayScale.com for New York state. In other states such as Illinois, Florida and Texas,
translators are paid only 40-60% of the salary of financial analysts.
4Source: Click2Translate.com cost estimate for translation by a native speaking translator from German to English.
5Importantly, many costs associated with learning about foreign assets, such as understanding the legal environ-
ment and the tax treatment of foreign earned income, tend to be fixed costs. Fixed costs cannot explain the observed
lack of diversification, because after they are sunk, the investor should invest in a well diversified foreign portfolio.
Kang and Stultz (1997) and Seasholes (2004) find that foreign investment tends to be concentrated in a country’s
large, high-beta assets. This only makes sense if there are benefits to specialization (see section 4.2).
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3 A Rational Expectations Model of Specialized Learning
This section analyzes a model where small differences in investors’ information not only persist, but
are magnified by the increasing returns to learning. The only change in the model is that investors
do not take their asset demand, or the asset demand of other investors, to be fixed. Instead, we
apply rational expectations: every investor takes into account that every portfolio in the market
depends on what each investor learns. We conclude that the assumption of information immobility
is a defensible one. It is not that home investors can’t learn foreign information; they choose not
to. They make more profit from specializing in what they already know.
3.1 The Period-2 Portfolio Problem
We solve the model using backwards induction, starting with the optimal portfolio decision, taking
information choices as given. Given posterior mean µˆj and variance Σ̂j of asset payoffs, the portfolio
for investor j, from either country, is
qj =
1
ρ
(Σ̂j)−1(µˆj − pr). (10)
Aggregating these asset demand across investors and imposing the market clearing condition
(7) delivers a solution for the equilibrium asset price level.
Proposition 2 Asset prices are a linear function of the asset payoff and the unexpected component
of asset supply: p = 1r (A+ f + Cx).
Proof is in appendix A.2, along with the formulas for A and C.
3.2 The Optimal Learning Problem
In period 1, the investor chooses information to maximize expected utility. In order to impose
rational expectations, we substitute the equilibrium asset demand (10), into expected utility (8).
Combining terms yields
U = E
[
1
2
(µˆj − pr)′(Σ̂j)−1(µˆj − pr)|µ,Σ
]
. (11)
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At time 1, (µˆj − pr) is a normal variable, with mean (−A) and variance Σp − Σ̂j .6 Thus, expected
utility is the mean of a chi-square. Using the fact that the choice variable Λˆ is a diagonal matrix,
that Σ̂ = ΓΛˆΓ′, that −Γ′iA is as in equation (18), and the formula for the mean of a chi-square, we
can rewrite the period-1 objective as:
max
Λˆj
∑
i
(
Λpi + (ρΓ′ix¯Λˆ
a
i )
2
)
(Λˆji )
−1 s.t. (3) and (4) (12)
where Λpi is the ith eigenvalue of Σp, and Λˆai = (
∫
j(Λˆ
j)−1)−1 is the posterior variance of risk factor
i of a hypothetical investor whose posterior belief precision is the average of all investors’ precisions.
3.3 Results: Learning with Increasing Returns
The key feature of the learning problem (12) is that it is convex in the posterior variance. It is the
convexity of the objective that delivers us a corner solution. The solution is to reduce variance on
one risk factor as much as possible.
Proposition 3 Optimal Information Acquisition In general equilibrium with a continuum of
investors, each investor j’s optimal information portfolio uses all capacity to learn about one linear
combination of asset payoffs. The linear combination is the payoff of risk factor i f ′Γi associated
with the highest value of the learning index: Λˆ
a
i
Λji
ρ2(Γ′ix¯)2Λˆai +
Λpi
Λji
.
Proof : See appendix A.3.
Three features make a risk factor desirable to learn about. First, since information has increasing
returns, the investor gains more from learning about a risk that is abundant (high (Γ′ix¯)2). Second,
the investor should learn about a risk factor that the average investor is uncertain about (high Λˆai ).
These risks have prices that reveal less information (high Λpi), and higher returns: Γ′iE[f − pr] =
ρΛˆai Γ
′
ix¯. (See A.2.) Third, and most importantly for the point of the paper, the investor should
learn about risk factors that he had an initial advantage in, relative to the average investor (high
Λˆai /Λi). Since these are the assets he will expect to hold more of, these are more valuable to learn
about.
The feedback effects of learning and investing can be seen in the learning index. The amount
of a risk factor that an investor expects to hold, based on his prior information, is the factor’s
6To derive this variance, note that var(µˆ|µ) = Σ− Σ̂, that var(pr|µ) = Σ + Σp, and that cov(µˆ, pr) = Σ.
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expected return, divided by its variance: Λ−1i ρΛˆ
a
i Γ
′
ix¯. This expected portfolio holding shows up in
the learning index formula, indicating that a higher expected portfolio share increases the value of
learning about the risk. Expecting to learn more about the risk decreases its expected posterior
variance Λˆi. Re-computing the expected portfolio with variance Λˆ, instead of Λ, further increases
i’s portfolio share, and feeds back to increase i’s learning index. This interaction between the
learning choice and the portfolio choice, an endogenous feature of the model, is what generates the
increasing returns to specialization.
Aggregate Learning Patterns Learning is a strategic substitute. Because other investors’
learning lowers the Λˆai and Λpi for the risks they learn about, each investor prefers to learn about
risks that others do not learn. Consider constructing this Nash equilibrium by an iterative choice
process. The first investor will begin by learning about the risk with the highest learning index.
Suppose there is another risk factor j whose learning index is not far below that of i. Then the fall
in Λˆai , brought on by some investors learning about i will cause other investors to prefer learning
about j. Ex-ante identical investors will learn about different risks. All home investors will be
indifferent between learning about any of the risks that any home investor learns about. Foreign
investors will also be indifferent between any of the foreign risks that are learned about.
Although investors may be indifferent between specializing in any one of many risk factors, the
aggregate allocation of capacity is unique. The number of home and foreign risk factors learned
about in each country will depend on the country-wide capacity. The within-country equilibrium
capacity allocation is described in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005). Despite the fact that
many risk factors are potentially being learned about in equilibrium, it remains true that each
investor learns about one of these factors.
Learning and Information Asymmetry Let Λh,Λf , Λˆh and Λˆf be N/2-by-N/2 diagonal ma-
trices that lie on the diagonal quadrants of the prior and posterior belief matrices: Λ = [Λh0; 0Λf ]
and Λˆ = [Λˆh0; 0Λˆf ]. And, let the ? superscript on each of these matrices denotes foreign belief
counterparts. Then, for example, log(|Λf |) represents home investors’ prior uncertainty (entropy)
about foreign risk factors and log(|Λˆ?h|) represents foreigners’ posterior uncertainty about home
risks.
Corollary 2 Learning Amplifies Information Asymmetry: symmetric markets If for
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every home factor hi, there is a foreign factor fi such that Λhi = Λ?fi and Γhix¯ = Γfix¯, then home
investors will learn exclusively about home risks and foreign investors will learn exclusively about
foreign risks.
Proof : See appendix A.4.
When risk factors are symmetric, an investor with no information advantage would be indifferent
between learning about home and foreign risks. A slight advantage in home risk delivers a strict
preference for specializing in that risk. This effect can be seen in the learning index: an information
advantage in risk i implies that the variance of prior beliefs Λji is low. A low Λ
j
i increases the value
of the learning index and makes learning about risk i more desirable. Since investors with no
information advantage are indifferent, any size initial advantage tilts preferences toward learning
more about home risks and amplifies the initial advantage.
Corollary 3 Learning Amplifies Information Asymmetry: general case Learning will
amplify initial differences in prior beliefs for every pair of home and foreign investors: |Λˆ
?
h|
|Λˆh| ≥
|Λ?h|
|Λh|
and |Λˆf ||Λˆ?
f
| ≥
|Λf |
|Λ?
f
| .
Proof : See appendix A.4.
The effect of an initial information advantage on a learning is similar to the effect of a compara-
tive advantage on trade. Home investors always have a higher learning index than foreigners do for
home risks. Likewise, foreigners have a higher index for foreign risks. If home risks are particularly
valuable to learn about, for example because those risks are large (high Γ′ix¯), some foreigners may
choose to learn about them. But, if home risks are valuable to learn about, all home investors will
specialize in them. Likewise, if some home investors learn about foreign risks, then all foreigners
must be specializing in foreign risks as well. The one pattern the model rules out is that home
investors learn about foreign risk and foreigners learn about home risk. This is like the principle of
comparative advantage: If country A has an advantage in apples and country B an advantage in
bananas, the only production pattern that is not possible is that country A produces bananas and
B apples. Investors never make up for their initial information asymmetry by each learning about
the others’ advantage. Instead, posterior beliefs diverge, relative to priors; information asymmetry
is amplified.
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The more asymmetric the markets, the less learning will amplify information asymmetry. In
the most extreme asymmetric case, the initial advantage will just be preserved. For example, if the
home market is much smaller than foreign, then all investors might learn about foreign risk factors;
the ratio of home and foreign investors’ posterior precisions will then be the same as the ratio of
their prior precisions.
3.4 Home Bias in Investors’ Portfolios
To explore the implications of the theory for home bias, we first need to define a benchmark
diversified portfolio. We consider two benchmarks. The first portfolio is one with no information
advantage and no capacity to learn. If home investors and foreign investors have identical posterior
beliefs, they hold identical portfolios. Actual portfolios depend on the realization of the asset supply
shock. The expected portfolio as of time 1 for each investor is equal to the per capita expected
supply x¯.
E[qno adv] = x¯ (13)
A second natural benchmark portfolio is one where investors have initial information advantages,
but no capacity (K = 0) to acquire signals and do not learn through prices. This is the kind of
information advantage that Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) capture when they estimate the
home bias that uncertainty about foreign accounting standards could generate.
E[qno learn] = ΓΛ−1ΛaΓ′x¯, (14)
where Λa is the average investor’s prior variance.
Specialization in learning does not imply that the investors hold exclusively home assets. They
still exploit gains from diversification. Each investor’s portfolio takes the world market portfolio
(x¯ in equation (15)) and tilts it towards the assets i that he knows more about than the average
investor (high Λˆ−1i Λˆ
a
i ). The optimal expected portfolio with an initial information advantage and
capacity to learn K > 0 is:
E[q] = ΓΛˆ−1ΛˆaΓ′x¯ (15)
Learning has two effects on an investors portfolio. The first is that it magnifies the position he
decides to take, and the second is that it tilts the portfolio towards the assets learned about. The
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magnitude effect can be seen from equation (10). The information advantage, coupled with learning
choices, reduces home investors’ risk of investing in home assets. (Σˆ−1i = ΓΛˆ
−1
i is high for home
risks i.) Lower risk makes investors want to take larger positions, positive or negative, in the asset.
But why should the position in home assets be a large long position, rather than a large short one?
The direction effect, which is a general equilibrium effect, makes home investors want to hold a
positive quantity of their home assets. The return on an asset compensates the average investor for
the amount of risk he bears Λˆai . The fact that foreign investors are investing in home assets without
knowing much about them, pushes up the asset’s return. Home investors are being compensated
for more risk than they bear (Λˆai > Λˆ
j
i in equation 15). Based on their information, this asset
delivers high risk-adjusted returns. High returns make a long position optimal, on average. It is
still possible that a very negative signal realization would make home investors want to short home
assets, but the expected portfolio holding is long. Both the information advantage and the general
equilibrium effect increase home bias as capacity rises.
The next two propositions formalize the difference between the optimal portfolio (15), and the
benchmark portfolios (14) and (13). Let Γh be a sum of the eigenvectors in Γ which correspond
to the home risk factors. Then Γ′hq quantifies how much total home risk an investor is holding in
their portfolio.
Proposition 4 Information Mobility Increases Home Bias: symmetric markets If for
every home factor hi, there is a foreign factor fi such that Λhi = Λ?fi and Γhix¯ = Γfix¯, then every
home investor’s expected portfolio contains more of assets that load on home risk when he can learn
(K > 0), than when he cannot (K = 0): Γ′hE[q] > Γ
′
hE[q
no learn] > Γ′hE[q
no adv].
Proof : See appendix A.5.
When asset markets are symmetric, every investor learns exclusively about their home risk fac-
tors (corollary 2). Because of the information and general equilibrium effects, learning (information
mobility) increases the expected home asset position.
The extent of the home bias depends on what this investor knows relative to the average investor.
When K = 0, the posterior variance Λˆ is the same as the prior variance Λ, and equal to the average
variance (Λˆa = Λa). The optimal portfolio is the no-learning portfolio (q = qno learn). As capacity
K rises, the posterior variance falls on the assets the investor learns about (Λˆ−1i rises), and those
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assets become more heavily weighted in the portfolio. The more capacity an investor has, the more
their portfolio is tilted away from the diversified portfolio and towards the assets they learn about.
Proposition 5 Information Mobility Increases Home Bias: general case The average
home investor’s portfolio contains at least as much of assets that load on home risk when he can
learn (K > 0), than when he cannot (K = 0): Γ′hE[q] ≥ Γ′hE[qno learn] > Γ′hE[qno adv].
Proof : See appendix A.5.
When market size is different across countries, corollary 3 shows that no home investor will
learn more about foreign risks than any foreign investor will, and vice versa. Therefore, the average
home investor knows more about home risks, and tilts his portfolio to hold more of them.
In the most extreme case, all investors learn about one risk (for example because that risk
is large). The ratio of home investors’ and the average investor’s posterior variance is the same
whether investors have positive or zero capacity. This implies that E[q] = E[qno learn]. In this
extreme case, learning does not amplify the home bias, but it doesn’t undo it either as in section
2 (E[q] > x¯).
When home risk factors are small, home investors are more likely to learn about larger foreign
risks, and reduce the average level of home bias. This prediction fits with evidence on the cross-
country patterns of home bias. Small risk-factor countries should have smaller financial markets
and assets with lower world-market betas. Small countries such as Belgium, The Netherlands, and
Scandinavian countries all have less home bias than the U.S., Japan or larger European countries
(Morse and Shive, 2003).
The next proposition shows that home investors earn higher returns on home assets. Following
Admati (1985), we define the excess return on asset i as (fi − pir).
Proposition 6 Better-Informed Investors Earn Higher Returns As capacity K rises, the
expected return an investor earns on the component of his portfolio that he learns about, rises:
∂E[(Γ′iq)(Γ′i(f − pr))]/∂K > 0.
Proof : See appendix A.6. Home investors earn excess returns on home assets. This is consistent
with evidence found by Hau (2001). Foreigners don’t learn about home assets, but hold them as
part of their diversified portfolio. The home investor profits from his superior information on home
assets. The more learning capacity the home investor has, the stronger the information advantage.
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It is not the case that an investor raises his expected profit (fi−pir) on any one share of asset i
by learning. Payoffs f are exogenous and prices p are determined by the average investor. Rather,
a better-informed investor takes a larger position in the assets that he learns about, and increases
the correlation of his asset demand q with asset payoffs (f − pr).7 He holds a long position in the
asset when it is likely to pay high returns, and shorts the asset when it is likely to pay very low
returns.
3.5 A Numerical Example
In this section we illustrate the magnitude of the home bias that our learning mechanism can
generate, by way of a numerical example. We start from the symmetric setup outlined in proposition
3. There are two countries, home and foreign, with a large number of investors (1000) in each.
The risk aversion parameter of all investors is ρ = 2. There are N assets in the economy, Nh = 5
home assets and Nf = 5 foreign assets. We consider a case with symmetric information advantages:
home investors face proportionately less risk from the first N/2 factors and foreign investors have an
identical risk reduction for the last N/2 factors. Then prior variance eigenvalues are (1+α)Λh = Λ?h
and Λf = (1 + α)Λ?f . The parameter α ≥ 0 measures the strength of the information advantage.
Uncorrelated assets In the first exercise, all assets in the economy are mutually uncorrelated.
The eigenvector matrix Γ is the identity matrix. The supply of each asset is set to one (x¯ =1),
making the quantity of each risk factor one as well (Γ′x¯ = 1). The asset supply variance is set to
make prices as informative as signals. Expected payoffs for home and foreign assets are equal. They
are equally spaced between 1-2% per period (per month). The mean of the average investor’s prior
belief is equal to the true asset payoffs. The standard deviation of prior beliefs is first set between
5-10%, such that all assets have the same expected payoff to standard deviation ratio. Then, the
variance of home investors’ prior beliefs about home assets is set ten percent lower than foreign
investors’ variance (α = 0.1). The reverse is true for foreign assets. We vary learning capacity K
to explore its effect.
7Corr(q, f − pr) = corr(µˆ − pr, f − pr). Since, µˆ is an unbiased expectation of f , it is equal to f + ², where ² is
orthogonal to f and pr. The variance of ² is the variance of f , conditional on µˆ, which is Σ̂. Thus, corr(q, f − pr) =
(var(f−pr)+Σ̂)−1/2var(f−pr)var(f−pr)−1/2] = (var(f−pr)+Σ̂)−1/2std(f−pr). As capacity increases, expectation
error variance Σ̂ falls, and correlation rises.
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Following convention, we define the home bias as
home bias = 1− 1− share of home asset in home portfolio
share of foreign assets in world portfolio
(16)
In this example, the share of foreign assets in the world portfolio is 0.5. The share of foreign assets
in the home portfolio is an average over all home investor portfolios.
The first benchmark is a world where there is no initial information advantage and no learning
capacity. The home bias is zero. The second benchmark is an economy with initial information
advantage (α = 0.1), but no learning capacity (K=0). This calculation represents the home bias
that is purely due to the initial advantage. The ten percent initial information advantage leads to
a 5.3 percent home bias in asset holdings. Next, we switch on the learning mechanism by giving
each investor a positive capacity K. Learning substantially magnifies the home bias because each
home investors specialize in learning about one home asset. The magnification increases steeply
in the learning capacity. When there is only enough capacity to view a signal that eliminates 20
percent of the risk in one asset (K=.22, 1− e−K = .20), the home bias almost doubles from 5.3 to
9.3 percent. When there is enough capacity to eliminate 61 percent of the risk in one asset (K=.95,
1− e−K = .61), the home bias is 31.4 percent, six times as large as without learning effect.
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Figure 2: Home Bias Increases With Capacity.
Numerical example with two countries. Assets within a country have correlated payoffs (cov= .032). Home bias is defined in
(16). The ‘no advantage’ line (stars) gives the home bias in an economy with no initial informational advantage and no capacity
to learn. The ‘no learning’ line (diamonds) refers to the home bias in a world with a small initial information advantage (10%)
and no learning capacity. The ‘learning’ line (circles) plots the home bias in our model. The initial information advantage is
10% and the learning capacity K varies between 0.05 and 0.85. The horizontal axis plots the potential percentage reduction in
the standard deviation of one asset, 1− e−K .
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Correlated Home Assets When home assets are positively correlated with each other (covari-
ance of .032), and foreign assets are positively correlated with each other (covariance of .032), but
the two sets of assets are mutually uncorrelated, each investor learns about one risk factor, that all
his domestic assets load on. Introducing correlation doubles the home bias: Home bias is 18.7%
when 1 − e−K = .20 and increases to 45.9% for 1 − e−K = .61. (See line with circles in figure 2.)
In contrast, the no learning benchmark is virtually unaffected (5.3%, line with diamonds). The
reason for this increase is that the set of assets an investor learns about becomes more diversified.
Such portfolio is less risky to hold. Therefore, the investor takes a larger position and holds more
of the home risk factor. The home bias in the numerical example does not match the 76% home
bias in the U.S. portfolio data, for the levels of capacity we explored. In the next section, we endow
investors with advantages in local risks, rather than country risks. This change in the information
structure allows the model to match the data.
4 Extensions
4.1 Local Investing: Heterogeneous Home Information
In the model of section 3, all home investors have the same precision signals. Because they were
ex-ante identical, home investors were indifferent between holding their portfolio or the portfolio
held by any other home investor. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) have shown that many investors
prefer not only home assets, but local assets. By giving investors slightly more precise signals over
local assets, this model can explain the local investment bias, and the accompanying excess returns
from investing locally.
Suppose that home investors each had an advantage in only one home risk factor, the one most
concentrated in their region’s asset. We assume, without loss, that there is one asset per region. An
investor j from region m draws an independent prior belief from the distribution µj ∼ N(f,Σm),
where Σm = ΓΛmΓ, and Λm has a mth diagonal entry that was lower than the mth diagonal in the
beliefs of any other region. With this setup, all of the results of section 3 still hold.
Investors from various localities will have an incentive to learn more about their local assets,
because of the pre-existing information advantage (proposition 3). Preserving, or amplifying local
information advantages causes expected portfolios to weight local assets more heavily, and to make
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higher expected profits from trading local assets (proposition 6). This is consistent with evidence
that local investments earn an extra 2% risk-adjusted return per year (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001).
The assets for which local advantage is most valuable are assets that others are not learning about
(high Λa). Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2004) show that individual investors, who hold portfolios
that are concentrated in local stocks, not listed on the S&P 500, make returns that are 7% higher
than what they would earn on a diversified portfolio.
A unified explanation for home bias and within-country local bias is something that many
theories of home bias cannot provide. Explanations rooted in exchange rate risk, institutional
difference, or language barriers do not apply to differences in portfolios across U.S. regions. The
fact that a home bias is present both within and across national borders, makes an information-
based explanation appealing. An extreme example of specialized information about local assets is
information about one’s own firm. With a tiny advantage in an investor’s own firm, the investor
would rationally learn more about his firm and overweight it in his portfolio. However, a detailed
analysis of the own-company stock puzzle is beyond the scope of this project.
Numerical Example To quantify the local bias, we use the same numerical example as in section
3.5. There is correlation among home and among foreign assets, but no correlation between home
and foreign assets. There are 5 regions at home and 5 regions abroad, each with one local asset.
The only difference between this exercise and the one in section 3.5 is that instead of giving 1000
home (foreign) investors a 10% initial information advantage in every home (foreign) asset, we give
200 investors each a 50% information advantage in one asset; the aggregate information advantages
at home and abroad are unchanged. We measure local bias as:
local bias = 1− 1− share of local asset in local portfolio
share of non− local assets in world portfolio (17)
We could also interpret this as the home bias in a 10-country world. It could also represent a bias
toward industries that investors have prior knowledge of, perhaps because of their job.
Without learning, the average local bias is only 5.0%. With learning capacity, 1− e−K = 0.61,
the average local bias is 35%. This average understates the local bias in many regions; the highest
is 49%. A local bias of 35% (49%) implies that the local investor holds 41% (54%) of their portfolio
in the local asset. This is 4.1 (5.4) times larger than what full diversification would predict.
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We compute the home bias in this economy by averaging positions in all home assets across
home investors. Without learning, the home bias is 7.5%. Home bias increases with learning, to
22% for low capacity (1− e−K = 0.20) and 72% for high capacity (1− e−K = 0.58), which is close
to the 76% home bias observed in the data.
Giving investors a local advantage as opposed to a home advantage in all home assets (section
2.5) generates 26% more home bias (for high capacity), even though the aggregate information
advantage is the same. This is because an investor’s portfolio share in an asset depends on the
difference between the risk he bears and the risk he is compensated for. When fewer investors
share an advantage in the same risk, they have a larger advantage relative to the average investor,
and earn higher returns. Because the returns to specialization are higher, investors diversify their
portfolios less.
4.2 High-Capacity Home, Low-Capacity Foreign Investors
Using foreign investment data from Taiwan, Seasholes (2004) finds that foreign investors outper-
form the Taiwanese market, particularly when foreigners are investing in assets that are large and
highly correlated with the macroeconomy. He argues that “The results point to foreigners having
better information processing abilities, especially regarding macro-fundamentals.” We can ask of
our model: If Taiwanese investors have low capacity, will Americans invest in Taiwanese assets?
Will they outperform the market? Will American excess returns be concentrated in assets that
load heavily on the largest risk factors? The answer to all three questions turns out to be yes.
When American capacity greatly exceeds Taiwanese capacity, then Americans will invest in
Taiwan to capture higher returns. To see why, suppose instead that all investors devote their
capacity to learning only about their respective home risks. Since Americans have more capacity,
they will reduce the average posterior variance for their assets by more: Λˆahi < Λˆ
a?
fi , for equally-
sized home and foreign risks hi and fi. Recall that expected returns are determined by average
posterior variance; when Americans have higher capacity, expected returns for US assets are lower
than for Taiwanese assets. There will be some level of capacity difference that will create a great
enough difference in returns to induce some Americans to invest in Taiwan. Expecting to hold
Taiwanese assets, some Americans will learn about Taiwan. As Americans learn about Taiwan,
they depress Taiwanese returns. This does not mean that returns in Taiwan and the U.S. will be
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equalized. Those Americans who learn about Taiwan will still face more posterior risk than if they
had learned about the U.S., because of their initial information disadvantage in Taiwan. Higher
returns in Taiwan compensate Americans for the higher posterior risk they bear.
Although U.S. investors face more posterior uncertainty in Taiwan than in the U.S., they can still
outperform the average Taiwanese investor, when trading in the Taiwanese assets they research.8
If Americans have capacity that exceeds Taiwanese capacity by more than the size of their initial
information advantage in one risk factor, then Americans can become better informed about that
risk than the average Taiwanese investor. By proposition 6, being more informed than the average
investor implies than the American investor will out-perform the average investor in assets that
load on his researched risk factor (fi).
What are the Taiwanese risk factors that Americans will learn about? Assuming that the
average uncertainty (Λˆa), noise in prices (Λp) and American uncertainty (Λ) about each Taiwanese
risk is identical, then the most valuable risk to reduce is the one with the largest quantity, the
highest Γix¯ (proposition 3). Americans should learn about, hold more of, and profit from the risk
factors that the largest assets weight most heavily on.9 Thus, the model, and Seasholes’ data, both
predict that high-capacity foreigners trading large assets, with high market covariance, are likely
to out-perform the market.
4.3 Portfolio Flows and Gravity Models
Patterns of learning about foreign assets tell us about what patterns of equity flow volume should
look like. The large cross-border equity flows observed have proven difficult to reconcile with many
theories of home bias (Tesar and Werner 1995). However, Coval (2000) and Brennan and Cao
(1987) have shown that information asymmetry across borders can account jointly for the home
bias and the high trade volume. This paper extends those explanations by forwarding a theory that
predicts when investors in different countries will be most likely to learn different information. Are
these predictions about information asymmetry consistent with the patterns of equity flow volume?
Answering this question is complicated by the fact that learning about foreign assets has two
opposing effects on gross equity flows between the home and foreign countries. First, learning makes
8Americans may also hold Taiwanese assets for diversification purposes, without learning about them. These
American investors will under-perform relative to the locals.
9If Americans start out knowing a little bit more about the large foreign risk factor than about smaller risks, the
effect is reinforced.
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foreign assets less risky to home investors. Facing less risk, they take a larger position in foreign
assets. When news prompts home investors to trade, their larger position increases the size of their
trade. This is a scale effect: It increases total trade, but not the turnover rate (trade per share
held). Second, learning moves home investors’ beliefs closer to the true foreign payoff, and closer
to the beliefs of the foreign investors, on average. The decrease in information asymmetry makes
home and foreign investors less willing to trade with each other. This decreases turnover. Only
when beliefs differ will one want to sell when the other wants to buy. On net, learning decreases
the turnover rate, but it can increase total trade volume.
In the data, patterns of equity flows line up closely with countries’ geographical distance from
each other. Tesar and Werner (1994) show that turnover rates between 5 OECD countries are
higher for countries that are farther away, and are inversely related to portfolio share. Portes, Rey
and Oh’s (2001) gravity model estimation shows that geographically close markets, with highly
correlated returns, generate larger gross equity flows. All three stylized facts: gross flows, turnover
rates, and portfolio shares could be explained by learning.
The model predicts the pattern of information implied by the data, because highly correlated
markets are efficient to learn about. High correlation of neighboring country returns means that
the risk factors that each country’s assets load on most heavily are, to large extent, common.
Given an information advantage in a home risk factor, home investors also have some advantage in
neighboring country assets that load on the same factor. An initial advantage in such a common
risk may lead home investors to specialize in it, and learn about the foreign assets that load on it.
High correlation makes segments of neighboring countries have information properties similar to
home markets. Direct evidence on information flows bolster this prediction. Portes and Rey (2003)
find that nearby markets exchange abundant information: they exhibit high telephone traffic and
strong evidence of insider trading.
The other important feature of models is that market size increases portfolio flows. This is
consistent with our model because of the increasing returns to information. Learning about large
risk factors (big Γix¯) generates more profit because applying a signal to many shares generates
more profit than applying it to only a few (proposition 3). If investors learn about the risk factors
of large markets, and learning is related to flow volume, then flow volume should be highest for the
markets that are most valuable to learn about: large ones.
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Gravity model findings fly in the face of standard investment theory because investors trade
most with countries whose assets offer little diversification benefit. It is precisely because these
assets are poor diversification devices, that it is efficient to learn about them, to hold them, and
therefore to trade them prolifically.
5 Conclusions
This paper examined the common assumption that residents of one region have more information
about their region’s assets than do non-residents. In particular, it poses the question: If investors
are restricted in the amount of information they can learn about risky asset payoffs, which assets
would they choose to learn about? We show that an investor, who does not account for the effect
of learning on his portfolio choice, chooses to study risks he is most uncertain about. He undoes
his initial advantage. But, investors with rational expectations reinforce their initial information
advantages. Initial information advantages lead the investor to believe that he will hold slightly
more of the asset than the average investor will. Knowing that the asset will be a larger part of his
portfolio causes the investor to value learning about it more. An initial information advantage in
a risk is like a comparative advantage in learning about that risk. By each specializing in learning
about what they have a comparative advantage in, investors increase their information asymmetry.
Thus our main message is that information asymmetry assumptions in international finance are
defensible, but perhaps not for the reasons originally thought. We do not need to resort to large
information frictions; small frictions will suffice because learning will amplify them. With sufficient
capacity to learn, small initial information advantages can lead to a home bias of the magnitude
observed in the data.
The results characterizing optimal learning strategies can be applied to a wide range of envi-
ronments to deliver rich cross-sectional predictions. The theory can be interpreted as one of local
bias, and predicts the excess returns observed on local investors’ portfolios (Coval and Moskowitz
2001). The theory also predicts when investors will choose not to specialize in home assets, and
thus predicts patterns of foreign investment, and foreign investment returns. The prediction that
foreigners should hold and profit on large assets that are highly correlated with the market is
confirmed in empirical work by Seasholes (2004) and Kang and Stultz (1997). Finally, explaining
learning choices delivers a model of information flows, a leading explanatory variable in theories
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of cross-border equity trade (Coval 2000). The prediction that large information and equity flows
arise between countries with correlated returns squares with Portes and Rey’s (2003) finding that
geographic proximity is highly correlated with information proxies and equity trade.
Future work should focus on building a dynamic model of learning and investing. It could teach
us more about the patterns of equity flows. It could also pin down prior beliefs, a free parameters
in the static model. Since prior beliefs in a dynamic model must arise from posterior beliefs in a
prior period, modeling dynamic learning would restrict the admissible set of prior beliefs and give
the theory additional predictive power.
Asymmetry in prior beliefs could arise from risky labor income. Baxter and Jermann (1997)
argue that countries’ labor income growth and equity returns are highly correlated. Although this
correlation worsens the home bias puzzle in a standard model, it bolsters our explanation. Labor
income provides an initial information advantage that makes learning more about own country, own
industry, and own company assets optimal. Massa and Simonov (2004) document that Swedish
investors tilt their portfolio towards the industry they work in, and conclude that this is a rational
response to being better informed about their own profession.
An important assumption in our model was that every investor must process their own infor-
mation. If information capacity is costly, rather than fixed, then paying one portfolio manager to
learn about each risk is efficient. How might such a setting regenerate a home bias? By its nature,
selling information also generates an agency problem. A solution could involve auditing portfolio
managers. A manager from the same region, whose initial information resembles the investor’s, may
require less capacity to audit. In such a setting, portfolio managers who cater to nearby investors
would have incentives to learn that mirror their clients’ incentives. They would maximize profit by
reinforcing their initial information advantage and specializing in home assets. Our theory could
be reinterpreted as pertaining to these portfolio managers.
Information asymmetries play a prominent role in international finance. This paper provides
tools that can predict where asymmetries are most likely, and what form they will take. It also of-
fers a cautionary word about building theories around assumptions on information sets. Economic
agents can choose to acquire information and learn. Ignoring learning incentives when specify-
ing information structures raises questions about the resulting theories. These theories may be
analyzing situations that a utility-maximizing agent who can learn would never face.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The optimization problem is
max
Λˆ
∑
i
q˜2i Λˆi
s.t. Λˆi ≤ Λi and ∏i Λˆi ≥ ∏i Λie−2K , where q˜i = Γ′iq. The first-order condition for this problem is
q˜2i − υ
1
Λˆi
∏
i
Λˆi + φi = 0
where υ is the Lagrange multiplier on the capacity constraint and φi is the Lagrange multiplier
on the no-negative-learning constraint for asset i. Define M = υe−2K
∏
i Λi. The result that
Λˆi = min
{
Λi, Mq˜2i
}
follows from the first order condition and the no-negative learning constraint,
which states that φi = 0 when Λˆi > Λi. 2
A.1 Proof of Corollary 1
If (Λi− ²)q˜2i > M for i = argminj(Λj − ²)q˜2j , then 1 tells us that posterior beliefs Λˆi are unaffected
by an ² reduction in the prior belief. There exists a capacity K? such that mini
(
(Λi − ²)q˜2i
)
=
M . All that is left is to characterize K?. Since the capacity used learning about a factor j is
log(Λj) − log(Λˆj) = log(Λj) − log( 1q˜2jM) = log(Λj q˜
2
j ) − log
(
mini
(
(Λi − ²)q˜2i
))
, the total capacity
required is
K? = −N log
(
min
i
(
(Λi − ²)q˜2i
))
+
N∑
j=1
log(Λj q˜2j ).
2
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
From Admati (1985), we know that equilibrium price takes the form rp = A+Bf + Cx, where
A = −ρ
(
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1 + (Σaη)
−1
)−1
x¯,
C = −
(
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1 + (Σaη)
−1
)−1 (
ρI +
1
ρσ2x
(Σaη)
−1′
)
.
The matrix B is the identity matrix, because all investors have independently distributed priors.
We treat priors as though they were private signals. This assumption deviates from Admati (1985)
and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2004), which assumes that investors have identical priors.
Let Σηj be the variance-covariance matrix of the private signals that investor j chooses to
observe. For future use, we define the following three precision matrices. They are derived from
the above pricing function and the definitions for A, B, and C. (Σaη)
−1 is the average precision
of investors’ information advantage, plus the average precision of the information they choose to
learn. (Σp)−1 is the precision of prices as a signal about true payoffs. (Σ̂a)−1 is the average of all
investors’ posterior belief precisions, taking into account priors, signals and prices.
(Σaη)
−1 = Γ(Λaη)
−1Γ′ =
1
2
Σ−1 +
1
2
(Σ?)−1 +
∫
j
(Σjη)
−1dj,
(Σp)−1 = ΓΛ−1p Γ
′ =
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1,
(Σ̂a)−1 = ΓΛˆ−1a Γ
′ =
1
ρ2σ2x
(ΣaηΣ
a′
η )
−1 + (Σaη)
−1
We have assumed that investors choose to obtain signals about the eigenvectors Γ of the prior
covariance matrix Σ. It is easy to show that when Ση has eigenvectors Γ, the three precision
matrices above also have the same eigenvectors.
We note and later use that CC ′σ2x = ρ2σ2xΣaηΣa′η = Σp, because C = −ρΣaη. We also use that
−Γ′iA = ρΓ′iΣˆax¯ = ρΓ′iΓΛˆaΓ′x¯ = ρ(Γ′ix¯)Λˆai , (18)
where the first equality follows from the definition of A and the definition of Σˆa, the second equality
follows from Σˆa = ΓΛˆaΓ′, and the last equality follows from Γ′Γ = I. 2
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Expected excess returns µˆ−pr are normally distributed with mean −A and variance VER = Σp−Σ̂.
The first part of the objective is Tr
(
Σ̂−1VER
)
, which we rewrite as Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂− Σ̂)
)
.
This is Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂)− I
)
or Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂)
)
−N . The trace is the sum of the
eigenvalues. Let yi, be the ratio of the precision of the posterior to the precision of the prior for risk i,
i.e. it is the ith eigenvalue of Σ̂−1Σ: yi ≡ Λˆ−1i Λi. LetXi be the ith eigenvalue of Σ−1(VER+Σ̂). Then
the ith eigenvalue of the matrix inside the trace is yiXi, and Tr
(
Σ̂−1ΣΣ−1(VER + Σ̂)
)
=
∑N
i=1Xiyi.
This is because Σ, Σ̂, and C all share the same eigenvectors Γ. The matrix Σ−1(VER + Σ̂) =
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Σ−1Σp has eigenvalues Xi = ΛpiΛ−1i . The second part of the object function is
∑N
i=1 θ
2
i yi, where
θ2i = (Γ
′
iA)
2 Λ−1i is the prior squared Sharpe ratio of risk factor i. The objective is to maximize∑N
i=1(Xi + θ
2
i )yi, where Xi + θ
2
i is the learning index of risk factor i. The maximization over {yi}
is subject to
∏N
i=1 yi ≤ e2K and yi ≥ 1+
Λ−1pi
Λ−1i
. This problem maximizes a sum subject to a product
constraint. A simple variational argument shows that the maximum is attained by maximizing the
yi with the highest learning index Xi+ θ2i . The investor devotes all his ‘spare capacity’ to learning
about this risk factor i. To be more precise, he sets yj = 1 +
Λ−1pj
Λ−1j
, for all risk factors j that he
does not learn about, and he uses all remaining capacity to obtain a private signal on risk factor
i: yi = τ
(
1 +
Λ−1pi
Λ−1i
)
, where τ = e
2K∏N
j=1
(
1+
Λ−1
pj
Λ−1
j
) . We endow the investor with enough capacity such
that he has spare capacity to acquire private signals after devoting capacity to learning from prices:∏N
j=1
(
1 +
Λ−1pj
Λ−1j
)
< e2K and therefore τ > 1. For future reference define the ‘spare capacity’ of an
investor who learns about risk factor i as
K˜i = K − 12
∑
j 6=i
log
(
1 +
Λ−1pj
Λ−1j
)
. (19)
2
A.4 Proof of Corollaries 2 and 3
The learning index for home risk factor i is always greater for a home investor:
Λpi
Λi
+
(Λˆai )
2
Λi
(Γ′ix¯)
2 >
Λpi
Λ?i
+
(Λˆai )
2
Λ?i
(Γ′ix¯)
2. (20)
because Λi < Λ?i . Likewise, the learning index of a foreign risk factor j is always greater for a
foreign investor:
Λpj
Λ?j
+
(Λˆaj )
2
Λ?j
(Γ′j x¯)
2 >
Λpj
Λj
+
(Λˆaj )
2
Λj
(Γ′j x¯)
2. (21)
because Λj > Λ?j .
Therefore, if one foreign investor learns about a home risk factor i, then all home investors must
also be learning about i, or some other risk factor with an equally high learning index. This other
risk factor must be a home risk factor, otherwise the foreign investor would strictly prefer to learn
about it. Let K˜ be the spare capacity for a particular home risk factor (19). Since every home in-
vestor learns about that home risk factor, then |Λˆh| = e−2K˜ |Λ−1h +Λ−1p |−1 and |Λˆf | = |Λ−1f +Λ−1p |−1.
Since foreign investors might learn about home risk, but might not: |Λˆ?h| ≥ e−2K˜ |Λ?h +Λ−1p |−1 and
since he might or might not learn about his own foreign risk: |Λˆ?f | ≤ |Λ?f + Λ−1p |−1. Since price
precisions (Λ−1p ) are constant and positive, taking ratios of |Λˆ?h| to |Λˆh| and of |Λˆf | to |Λˆ?f | yields
the result. The same argument can be made, in the case where one or more home investors learn
about foreign risks.
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Symmetric risk factors First, consider a one-agent deviation from the candidate symmetric
equilibrium where all home investors learn about home risk factors and all foreign investors learn
about foreign risk factors. In particular, suppose all foreign investors besides one were learning
about the equal-sized foreign risk factors (i,j such that Γix¯ = Γj x¯), in the same proportion as home
investors are learning about the equal-sized home risk factors. We assumed that Λi = Λ?j for the
equal-sized risk factors. Since an equal fraction of investors is learning about i and j, the average
signal precision for each risk, and the precision of the price signal will be equal (Λˆai )
2/Λi = (Λˆaj )
2/Λ?j
and Λpi = Λpj . Therefore, home investors get as much value from learning about i as foreign
investors get from learning about j:
Λpi
Λi
+
(Λˆai )
2
Λi
(Γ′ix¯)
2 =
Λpj
Λ?j
+
(Λˆaj )
2
Λ?j
(Γ′j x¯)
2. (22)
Combining (20) and (22) tells us that the foreign investor must strictly prefer learning about foreign
risk. So, a one-agent deviation from the equilibrium is not optimal.
Next, consider a multiple-agent deviation from the candidate symmetric equilibrium. Suppose
that foreign investors learn about the equal-size risk factors, but in different proportions, or that a
mass of foreign investors learns about home risks. Note that fewer investors learning about a risk
factor increases the (Λˆa)2/Λ and Λp for that factor. For one of the factors i that home investors
learn about, there must be fewer investors learning about the same-sized foreign risk factor j such
that ΛpiΛi +
Λˆai
Λi
(Γ′ix¯)2 <
Λpj
Λ?j
+
Λˆaj
Λ?j
(Γ′j x¯)2. This also implies that the foreign investor must strictly
prefer learning about j to i, or to any of the other equally valuable home risk factors. The analogous
argument can be made showing that home investors always learn about home risks. 2
A.5 Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
Symmetric risk factors By corollary 2, we know that an investor with K > 0 will learn about
a risk factor that they have an advantage in, one of their home risk factors. Let i denote that risk
factor. Then Λˆ−1i = e
2KΛ−1i . When agents can learn (K > 0), let ξi denote the fraction of home
investors that learn about home risk factor i. Then (Λˆai )
−1 = 12ξie
2K(Λi)−1 + 12(1 − ξi)(Λi)−1 +
1
2(Λ
?
i )
−1. The product Λˆ−1i Λˆ
a
i is increasing in K because the first term is increasing proportionally
and the second term is decreasing less than proportionally in e2K . Using equation (15), describing
the portfolio with K > 0 and equation (14), describing the no learning portfolio (K = 0), it follows
that the difference between the ith component, Γ′i(Λˆ−1Λˆa − Λ−1Λa)(Γx¯) is strictly positive. 2
General case By corollary 3, there are three situations to consider: all investors learn about
their own home assets, some home investors learn about foreign risk factors, or some foreigners
learn about home risk factors. This first case we considered in the previous paragraph. We prove
the third case here; the second one follows from the same logic.
When some foreign investors learn about home risks, all home investors must learn about home
risks as well. Every investor who learns about home risks is indifferent between learning about
any home risk learned about in equilibrium. While the extent of home bias won’t hinge on which
risk factor, within a country, any investor learns about, it simplifies our analysis to assume that
each investor who learns about home risks adopts a symmetric mixed strategy over which risks to
specialize in. Let ξi (ξ?i ) be the fraction of home (foreign) investors who learn about home risk i.
Because all home investors learn about home risks, it must be that: ξi ≥ ξ?i .
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Define Γ′iqha = (Λˆ
−1
i )
haΛˆaΓ′ix¯ to be the portfolio holdings of risk factor i of the average home
investor (ha). This follows from pre-multiplying both sides of equation (15) by Γ′i. Here, (Λˆ
−1
i )
ha =
ξie
2K(Λi)−1 + (1− ξi)(Λi)−1 is the average posterior precision of home investors about risk factor
i. The worldwide average precision is (Λˆai )
−1 = 12ξie
2K(Λi)−1 + 12(1− ξi)(Λi)−1 + 12ξ?i e2K(Λ?i )−1 +
1
2(1− ξ?i )(Λ?i )−1.
Consider the extreme case where all foreign investors learn about home risk factors (ξi = ξ?i ).
Then (Λˆ−1i )
haΛˆai can be shown to collapse to
2Λˆ−1i
Λˆ−1i +(Λˆ
?
i )
−1 . This expression does not depend on K.
This implies that the learning portfolio (K > 0) and the no-learning portfolio (K = 0) are identical:
E[qi] = E[qno learni ].
In all other cases, ξi > ξ?i . Taking a partial derivative of (Λˆ
−1
i )
haΛˆa reveals that it is increasing
in e2K . As a result, the difference between the learning and the no-learning portfolio on risk factor
i is strictly positive: E[qi] > E[qno learni ].
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
The expected portfolio return on a risk factor can be expressed as the expected portfolio weight
times the expected return of the factor, plus their covariance:
Expected return = (Γ′iE[q])(Γ
′
iE[(f − pr)]) + Γ′icov(q, f − pr)Γi. (23)
Using equation (15) and the price formula in appendix A.2,it can be shown that cov(q, f−pr) =
1
ρ(Σ̂
−1Σ− I). Canceling out orthogonal eigenvectors, we can rewrite:
Expected return =
1
ρ
(
Λˆ−1i (Γ
′
iA)
2 + Λˆ−1i Λi − 1
)
. (24)
Capacity allows the investor to increase his posterior precision for the risk factor he learns about
(∂Λˆ
−1
i
∂K > 0). One individual’s capacity does not affect the aggregate variable A or the given
exogenous variables Γi or Λi. Therefore, capacity increases the expected return. 2
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